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The Terrors of Nashe’s Terrors of the 
Night 
 
JOHN CASEY 
 
 
If we present a mingle-mangle, our fault is to be excused, 
because the whole world is become an hodge-podge. 
    —John Lyly 
 
 
n the midst of writing, asked what I was writing about, I faced a certain 
difficulty. I could tell others that I was working through Thomas Nashe’s The 
Terrors of the Night, but when follow-up questions asked what Nashe’s Terrors 
was exactly my answers were equal parts hesitant and rambling. Every 
conversation left me newly puzzled as to how to adequately describe The Terrors. I 
found that no account was repeated or repeatable. It was “a pamphlet on why we 
get frightened at night” or “a tract on sin and guilt” or “an essay on spirits and 
devils.” It is, of course, all and none of these things exactly. I admitted more than 
a few times that I did not know what The Terrors of the Night was nor did I know 
what it was intended to be. At my most flustered, I called it simply “a thing about 
things.” Improvised though my response was, it was informed by what Jonathan 
Crewe refers to as “the Nashe problem,” the question of whether Nashe’s prose 
says “something” or “nothing.”1 As Corey McEleney explains, criticism of Nashe 
traditionally responds, in one way or another, to this problematic. There are those 
who read him as “Bakhtinian or Derridean avant la lettre” and those “with the aim 
of resituating Nashe within the context of Renaissance humanism and the literary 
marketplace of Elizabethan England,” but despite the differences in these 
approaches they share the common goal of “rescuing Nashe from the accusation 
of having ‘nothing’ to say.”2  My description of The Terrors as “a thing about things” 
was a way of positioning myself between these camps. Seizing on Nashe’s 
pamphlet as a thing situated in the late Elizabethan world and concurrently 
attending to the mess of things discursively present within the pamphlet struck me 
as an apt response. Rather than respecting the critical disjunction, I tried to forge 
a conjunction: Nashe says something and nothing. His work is something and 
nothing. The pamphlet is a bit of ephemera (nothing) about imagined frights 
(nothings), but also a pamphlet (something) about moral horrors (somethings). 
His commitment to things, metaphysically substantial and otherwise, seemed 
everywhere evident. Indeed, James Nielson notes that Nashe’s writing has a 
tendency “to serve up signs as things, so that one is left just reading things.”3 
Pierre Macherey helped flesh out my vague ideas about this “thing about 
things.” He explains that “the literary thing is that multifaceted reality, a material 
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and immaterial production, both sides of which we have to embrace, even if this 
occasionally obliges us to acrobatic contortions.”4 This still appeals to me as a 
generative perspective to adopt in relation to Nashe’s Terrors which is, if nothing 
else, multifaceted, materially and immaterially productive, and obliges the reader 
or critic to contort themselves variously. I am not now, however, entirely sure that 
The Terrors contains anything we “have to” or even can “embrace” per se. Likewise, 
I am no longer convinced that the concept of “things” does the good work of 
capturing the peculiar trouble of reading The Terrors. Calling Nashe’s pamphlet “a 
thing about things” was meant to highlight the epistemic anxiety induced in the 
reader by this pamphlet. I tried to turn my failure to understand Nashe into a 
questionable explanation of why Nashe fails to be understood. Revising that essay, 
looking closely again at The Terrors of the Night, prompted me not only to question 
my assessment of the work, but also the methods I had used to assess it. Toril Moi 
tells us that reading literature critically does not mean “deciding in advance what 
the best option would be, as if the path was already there, waiting for us. We just 
have to risk it.”5 With Nashe, especially his Terrors, it feels to me that, even after 
having undertaken multiple readings, the “best option” for understanding remains 
illusory. Saying anything definitive still seems risky.  
I take Nashe’s principal concern in The Terrors of the Night to be the 
cultivation of uncertainty. All aspects of the pamphlet (e.g. form, style, material 
text, narrative, paratexts) work towards this end by courting contradiction and 
ambiguity. Nashe’s success in creating uncertainty at various levels means that 
arguments about The Terrors seem doomed to be circular (e.g. I am uncertain 
whether The Terrors of the Night instills uncertainty) and/or self-defeating (e.g. I am 
certain that The Terrors of the Night instills uncertainty). Anahid Nersessian suggests 
that a field like literary studies which “contradicts itself over time or at a time is a 
field obligated to its own disorder, metaphysical or otherwise. The point is not to 
eliminate that disorder but to give it its place in a theory.”6 The Terrors of the Night 
is an opportunity to tarry with disorder without eliminating it. This essay is, in a 
manner of speaking, disorderly as a result of trying to respond to the disorder of 
The Terrors. My aim is not to offer a way out of circular or self-defeating arguments, 
but rather to show that Nashe actively dissuades us from arriving at durable or 
stable solutions to certain problems. By attending to the uncertainties that inhere 
in The Terrors, the various pleasures or delights of reading Nashe fall away in the 
face of what I take to be the genuine terrors of reading him. This is not to say that 
reading Nashe’s tract is altogether unpleasant, but rather that whatever pleasures 
are engendered in us while reading are augmented by the unsettling 
epistemological and metaphysical entailments that follow from his claims. Reid 
Barbour highlights the “shocking presence” of Nashe’s writing and this “shocking 
presence” merits being taken seriously as an experience.7   
Taking seriously the experience of reading Nashe, without, in turn, 
formally or analytically reinscribing it into received understandings, either 
historical or theoretical, is an attempt to respect the particular trouble of his writing 
and its recalcitrant work. Jason Scott-Warren remarks that “Nashe’s writings invite 
us to reflect on the extent to which words are deeds and texts are things.”8 The 
Terrors of the Night, on this account, is something done with words, something done 
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to readers in the experience of reading. Carolyn Abbate argues that rather than 
looking to aesthetic objects as “works or texts to be interpreted” and “devising 
objectifying mechanisms in response” to the affective unsettlement we experience 
when faced with them, we should rather respect the fact that aesthetic experience 
“leaves us unguarded” and that “there are effects arising from aesthetic experience 
[...] that do not yield to any biographical, hermeneutic, historical, or sociological 
disarmament strategy.”9 Moi tells us that reading literature can begin “not with a 
method, but with our own sense of confusion.”10 I should like to add that reading 
Nashe’s Terrors of the Night begins and ends with “our own sense of confusion.” 
This claim is hardly novel or mine alone. The confusion of reading Nashe is as old 
as Nashe’s writing.  
In a prose tract published in 1597, written in response to Nashe’s work as 
a whole and his (now lost) play Isle of Dogs in particular, Richard Lichfield outlines 
a problem with Nashe similar to my own.11 He describes Nashe as being 
indescribable. In the preliminary note to the reader, Lichfield says that attempting 
to write about Nashe is like trying to clothe the moon.12 He is “a man of so great 
revolution, I could not fit him,” Lichfield admits, “for if I had undertaken to speak 
of one of his properties, another came into my mind, and another followed that, 
which bred confusion.”13 Nashe is intemperate, mutable. To think any singular 
feature of Nashe is to have your thoughts crowded with others. His principle 
property then is a multitude of competing properties, an oversaturation of 
qualities. Nashe, Lichfield’s screed continues, has “a place, but as a fleeting 
incorporeal substance, circumscribed with no limits.”14 The writer is like a gas, 
everywhere and nowhere at once. Bracketing the context and the tone in which 
Lichfield writes, the insults levelled against Nashe appear to be accurate 
descriptions. Tamsin Badcoe’s reading of Nashe follows similar lines. Nashe’s 
authorial persona, she says, is “dispersive.”15 It is something that “can be mauled, 
dismembered, and consumed by critics, but which also enables his work to go out 
in the world [...] Instead of merely being destructive, self-dispersal is also a 
pervasively generative act.”16 Badcoe’s claim is evidenced not only by how Nashe 
speaks of himself, but also by the way in which critics and readers attempt to 
describe him.  
In his introduction to the most recent Penguin edition of Nashe’s selected 
works, J.B. Steane asks, “What, ultimately, has Nashe to offer beyond the pleasure 
of watching a painter work with his colours, hearing a pianist go through his 
studies, or laughing with others at the table as Yorick jibes and gambols?”17 Steane 
feels the need to look beyond the act of writing itself in order to grasp Nashe and 
the purported pleasures he inspires. Nashe’s writing is represented as expansive 
enough to incorporate the work of artists, musicians, and fools. Notably, Steane’s 
analogy suggests that we appreciate what these figures are in the midst of doing 
rather than what they have done. It is not the final painting that concerns us, but 
the act of painting. Our pleasure is premised on imperfect acts. The invocation of 
Yorick, however, is surprising. Nashe is like other creative types, and then, quite 
suddenly, he is like a fictional character. Furthermore, the pleasures he is said to 
prompt resemble those of a fictional character whose only traits are given to us 
secondhand and posthumously.18 Yorick leads us to think of “infinite jest,” but 
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also the inevitability of “this favor” we call death. Considering Nashe as akin to 
Yorick is, at best, bittersweet. This comparison does not make Nashe more 
familiar to us, but rather erects a strange distance between him and us. C.S. Lewis, 
likewise, reaches toward Shakespearean characters for the sake of coming to terms 
with Nashe. Nashe writes like Falstaff speaks or, Lewis corrects himself, Falstaff 
speaks like Nashe writes.19 As with the comparison to Yorick, Falstaff brings 
merriment and ribaldry to mind, but also that that merriment and ribaldry 
ultimately leads to a form of exile, the experience of being forsaken. The 
“pervasively generative” character of Nashe pushes readers to figures at once 
comic and tragic. Lichfield’s experience of Nashe then holds true now. To think 
of Nashe is to think of other things. Direct description of the author’s qualities is 
frustrated, thus one comes to terms with Nashe by looking away from him, 
responding to him in terms other than his own. Yet these frustrations do not stop 
description, but seem to propel it onwards. This enigmatic figure is like a fictive 
character we are tasked with figuring out. Frustration and fascination are bound 
together with Nashe. It feels at once impossible and necessary to respond to him. 
His writing is a provocation and The Terrors of Night is an extreme example of that.  
Despite the growing interest in Nashe’s work, this pamphlet is frequently 
treated as peripheral to his oeuvre.20 Ronald McKerrow, the editor of the standard 
edition of Nashe’s works, notes in 1910 that The Terrors of the Night “is of so 
desultory a character that any attempt at analysis would be useless.”21 Critics, for 
the most part, took McKerrow’s statement to heart and half a century later in 1961, 
C.G. Harlow tells us that The Terrors of the Night “is little read today.”22 There have, 
however, been attempts to engage with Nashe’s Terrors since then and they 
frequently take up the very terms McKerrow used to dissuade us from such 
engagements. Per Sivefors’ analysis shows us that, in the end, “Nashe’s text 
becomes a text that reveals nothing other than its own desultoriness,” that “the 
very act of reading Nashe’s text becomes frivolous.”23 In Georgia Brown’s 
account, The Terrors is “a parody of the search for meaning.”24 It is a discourse that 
“satirizes fixed schemes of interpretation and those who claim to uncover 
Truth.”25 Perhaps an unspoken part of McKerrow’s assertion about the 
uselessness of analyzing Nashe’s text is that Nashe has already done it for us. 
Throughout this text we see evidence of what Barbour calls “[t]he anxiety of the 
oneiro-critic.”26 Derek Alwes suggests that Nashe’s frequent self-conscious 
intrusions on the text “tend to reveal his own uncertainty about meaning, his sense 
that accurate interpretation is ultimately impossible.”27 Pace McKerrow, it is not 
the case that interpretations of The Terrors are “useless,” but rather that their use 
lies in pinpointing just how useless Nashe takes interpretation to be. For 
McEleney, Nashe’s writing harbors “futilitarian commitments” (i.e. a concern for 
acts and ideas that do not privilege utility as such) that issue a challenge to all 
would-be critics.28 He argues for the necessity of “not redeeming or recuperating 
the pleasure of Nashe’s writing within humanistic systems of aesthetic, ethical, and 
social value.”29 Again, it seems that responding to Nashe calls on us to look outside 
of typical frames of reference. To some extent it seems that Nashe commits us to 
the kind of confusion Lichfield experienced in 1597.  
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Nashe deliberately and consistently thwarts understanding in The Terrors 
of the Night, but he is forthright about this fact. We are to understand that 
understanding is not viable here. He tells us that his “tractate is but a dream” and 
that “there is no certainty in dreams.”30 These statements are not, I do not think, 
mere acts of posturing or reflexivity. They do not exactly fall in line with what 
Roland Greene describes as “the seeming imperative of early modern prose, to 
discover and address its own protocols of representation irrespective of genre or 
convention.”31 They are not subsidiary to the text or work, as reflexive gestures 
typically are, but rather constitutive features of it. As Sivefors notes, the text 
“creates what might be termed a structural resemblance between its view of the 
chaotic state of dreaming and its own relentlessly associative technique.”32 The 
tract is what it hopes to describe, but whose dream is this exactly? Is it Nashe’s?  
Ours?  It is tempting to say that it belongs to the reader as much as to the author, 
but how then to reconcile this idea of a shared dream with Nashe’s statement that 
“it scarce hath been heard there were ever two men that dreamed alike”?33 The 
singularity of a dream means that “no man can rightly set down” all the different 
kinds or sorts of dreams one might experience.34 If The Terrors of the Night is a terror 
of the night, then no two experiences of it will be “alike.” Nashe undermines both 
the possibility of finding anything “certain” in the midst of his tract, but also 
undercuts any hope that we might viably compare notes on the kinds of 
uncertainty we experience in reading it. To take on The Terrors of Night on its own 
terms means acknowledging that it is something that yields no certainty and that 
acts of “setting down” the experience of it will be irredeemably fraught.  Nashe is 
as vulnerable as his readers to the trouble of “setting down” the experience of The 
Terrors. The conceit that the “tractate is but a dream” is, for instance, hardly 
consistent across the pamphlet, but this might simply confirm that all 
“cogitations” at night “run on heaps” and “confound in one gallimaufry.”35 The 
surest sign that this is a dream might be that it sometimes presents itself as if it 
were not a dream. It is and is not a terror. Indeed, even the claim that the “tractate 
is but a dream” confirms that it is both tractate and dream at once. If the law of 
noncontradiction does not hold in dreams, then The Terrors literally operates 
outside the bounds of reason. To bring this pamphlet within the purview of 
critique as it typically operates (i.e. according to certain methods, logics, standards) 
is to bracket or cast aside Nashe’s claims about what this thing is and how it works.   
Reading The Terrors of the Night on Nashe’s terms means, as Abbate says 
of aesthetic experience in general, “being open about one’s subjective position” 
even if this “can be seen as intellectually unsound or simply not acceptable.”36  
Moi, advocating a similar approach, tells us that “[t]o read—and to find the words 
in which to express one’s reading—is to stake one’s claims on one’s own 
perceptions, on one’s own experience of the text. There is no recipe - no method 
- for this.”37 Arguing for an acknowledgment of subjective experience is not as 
radical as it might initially sound. Nashe himself enacts a version of it throughout 
The Terrors. Mauricio Martinez highlights that Nashe’s habit of “laying stress on 
the individual” in The Terrors is part of what renders it distinct from Pierce Penniless 
and Christ’s Tears.38 Brown notes that “Nashe asserts individual interpretive agency, 
albeit in terms that hint at disdain for such individualism” when he says that 
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“Everyone shapes his own fortune as he lists. More aptly may be said, Everyone 
shapes his own fears and fancies as he lists.”39 I do not see the disdain that Brown 
does, but this does not mean it is not there. Nielson takes the above invocation of 
an individual’s agency as a “way out” of Nashe’s dream insofar as it “demands a 
reappropriation of one’s consciousness and one’s responsibility for it.”40 Nielson 
may be right to say that this is a “demand” on Nashe’s part, but it is not clear in 
The Terrors that these demands can be satisfied. The power of individual agents to 
“shape” anything is, at best, dubious.  
 
Fear, if I be not deceived, was the last pertinent matter I had 
under my displing, from which I fear I have strayed beyond 
my limits; and yet fear hath no limits, for to hell and beyond 
hell it sinks down and penetrates.41 
 
Fear has no limits and pushes those who take it up beyond their own. Fear 
“shapes” those who interact with it. It evades the “displing” of the author and 
even the metaphysical categories established by the discipline of Christian 
theology. Fear’s ability to shirk constraint sews uncertainty in Nashe. He may be 
deceived, he fears, about what “pertinent matter” absorbed him last. A similar 
force accrues around “fancies.” Nashe tells us that he “hastily undertook to write 
of the weary fancies of the night” and hopes to “weary none with [his] weak 
fancies.”42 Fancies qua dreams lead to fancies qua discourse. The content calls for 
a particular form or words call for wordplay. We are told that “that which is 
portentive in a king is but a frivolous fancy in a beggar.”43 What counts as a fancy 
is here determined by social position. What fancies are, say, or mean varies and 
changes across The Terrors, but never according to the express desires of an agent. 
The individual is implicated in fears and fancies, but the extent to which any 
particular individual can take full responsibility for the work of fears and fancies 
is an open question. What is “shaping” what is not easily determined.  
In the circuitous ethnography of the world’s differing conceptions and 
experiences of fears and fancies, Nashe surveys Persia, India, Iceland, Turkey, and 
Spain.44 While the aim of the ethnography is, broadly speaking, to dissuade us from 
taking our received understanding of terrors as a given, nonetheless Nashe’s 
discussion seems moved by something outside his control. He outlines each 
nation’s respective experiences of night terrors (e.g. Indian women are said to 
“often conceive by devils in their sleep”), but the survey eventually succumbs to 
disorder and departs wholly from the topic at hand.45 After becoming caught up 
in a comical (?) digression on Iceland’s religious relationship to ale, Nashe without 
warning throws us into a vituperative (?) passage on “filthy Italianate compliment-
mongers” and their “moth-eaten cod-piece suits.”46 The slight thread that ties the 
potentially lighthearted to the opprobrious is “cod.” The earlier mention of 
Iceland as a place where “there is nothing but stock-fish, whetstones, and cods’-
heads” finds itself echoed in the “cod-piece” of the “Italianate compliment-
monger.”47 There is a sense that above and beyond all other concerns, mere words 
are guiding Nashe rather than the other way around.48 This punning tendency can 
be read as evidence of the author’s playful wit, but it attests equally to language’s 
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slippery character. Moments like these contribute to a creeping feeling that The 
Terrors of the Night is not organized by Nashe. The discussion seems to govern itself, 
spur itself towards idiosyncratic ends. The sense that the Terrors is being written 
extempore as we read engenders suspense and disquiet. There is evidence that 
Nashe is subject to the whims of the terrors, but Nashe is the author of said 
terrors. He might merely choose to say that that he did not entirely choose to say 
certain things. Whether Nashe is playing with language or whether he is at pains 
to bring it under his “displing” is not readily visible on the page. The text can 
testify either way.        
“Come, come, I am entranced from my text, I wote well,” Nashe says, 
“and talk idly in my sleep longer than I should.”49 He remarks that he has been 
“tossed off and on I know not how” from “this drumbling subject of dreams.”50 
However we might take Nashe’s asides, the author presents himself as ill at ease 
and uncertain in and through his treatment of what makes us feel ill at ease and 
uncertain. Nashe could be accused of falling into the imitative fallacy. McEleney 
tells us that “the notion that imitative writing is fallacious would be foreign to a 
culture so committed to self-reflexive imitation as the Renaissance,” but the charge 
is not necessarily invalid because it is “foreign” to the time.51 Yvor Winters 
suggests that poetry is “by definition a means to arrest the disintegration and order 
the feeling” and thus any poem that merely imitates (rather than represents or 
conveys) “disintegration” is poetry that “fails to express anything.”52 Either poetry 
expresses itself in an “orderly” manner or it expresses nothing at all.  Beyond the 
fact that imitative reflexivity is endemic to early modern writing, it seems to me 
that there are broader problems with calling certain kinds of imitation fallacious. 
To express or represent confusion with clarity or uncertainty with certainty does 
an injustice to the problem of these troubling affective and epistemological 
experiences. To indulge in “mere” imitation, for Winters, is to allow form to 
“succumb” to the “raw material” it seeks to express, but, we should note, this is a 
fallacy he localizes in poetry.53 Does it obtain to ostensibly factual prose like 
Nashe’s Terrors?  In fact, a better question might be whether the primary aim of 
Nashe’s Terrors is factual at all. 
“The poet never maketh any circles about your imagination, to conjure 
you to believe for true what he writes. He citeth not authorities of other histories 
[...] in truth, not labouring to tell you what is or is not, but what should or should 
not be,” Sidney says.54 Nashe certainly makes circles about the reader’s 
imagination. He cites authorities. He labours to tell us what is and is not with only 
one exception. The dreams of the dying gentleman, which Nashe claims were the 
impetus for composing his tract, are poised somewhere between fact and fiction, 
truth and falsity55 Several pages are spent describing the visions of an elderly 
gentleman in rich detail. Whether this man’s experiences of “lusty sailors,” “stately 
devils,” and Lucifer himself “imitating in goodly stature the huge picture of 
Laocoon at Rome” are “true melancholy” or “true apparitions” Nashe “will not 
take upon [himself] to discern.”56 He tells us that he leaves the tale of visions “to 
be censured indifferently” by his readers. He also highlights that he has slightly 
altered it “for the recreation of [his] readers.”57 He has “welt[ed] and gard[ed] it 
with allusive exornations and comparisons.”58 He insists that “Truth is ever drawn 
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and painted naked, and I have lent her but a leathern patched cloak at most to 
keep her from the cold.”59 These acts of adornment are said to exist solely so that 
readers are not tired by the “coarse home-spun tale,” so that Truth “come not off 
too lamely and coldly.”60 The tale is there for us to “call it or miscall it” true or 
false.61 “If the world will give it any allowance of truth, so it is,” Nashe says.62  
Whether we attribute truth or falsity to the pamphlet is up to us as readers and, in 
large part, comes down to whether we take Nashe’s concerns seriously or 
frivolously. As with seemingly everything in the pamphlet, judging Nashe’s tone 
or intent is complex. Reading The Terrors, sentence by sentence, feels like being 
split between competing impulses. Nashe clearly wants to instruct and delight, but 
no less forcefully wants to obstruct and dismay.  
David Loewenstein argues that the “complex” and “unstable” quality of 
Nashe’s tone is prevalent and strategic.63  Stephen Hilliard notes that, in The Terrors, 
“it is difficult to tell when [the text] is serious and when it is mocking. Often 
seriousness slides into mockery in the manner of a tall tale.”64 A “tall tale” is what 
Nashe’s opening mention of friends, country life, and idle time would lead us to 
expect, yet the tonal uncertainty of The Terrors stays vexing.65 Even though we may 
be primed for vacillations in tone, the inability to readily identify which sentence 
is written in which tone has profound epistemological and affective effects.66 Peter 
Holland conjures up a (perhaps unintentionally) terrifying image of Nashe writing 
simultaneously “with the solemn face of the professional engaged in the quasi-
scientific analysis of dreams theory masked by the laughing grin of the professional 
writer.”67 We might assent that Nashe is solemn and grinning at once, but I am 
not so sure I can sense this on the page as I read. The post hoc identification of 
tonal ambiguity does not wholly account for the ad hoc experience of tonal 
ambiguity. As a result of Nashe’s tone, I read warily. I am constantly uncertain 
whether being concerned or contented by the ideas Nashe presents is apt. Tonal 
uncertainty or the alienation that subtends Nashe’s language is not merely implicit 
in the text. The ambivalent or ambiguous tenor of The Terrors is foregrounded 
before we even get into the content of the pamphlet. Formulaic features like the 
motto are subtly warped by Nashe as if to warn us of what follows.  
 Beneath the inscription of the pamphlet’s title reads the phrase Post 
Tenebras Dies.68 This is a subtle variation on the vulgate verse of Job 17:12. “Post 
tenebras spero lucem” [After darkness, I hope for light] or, in the abbreviated form, 
post tenebras lux.69 The biblical phrase operates on two registers simultaneously. It 
refers to the literal fact that, due to the earth’s rotation around the sun, light 
follows from darkness and vice versa, but it also expresses a moral or spiritual 
truth. After figurative darkness, whether this is understood as despair or sin, a 
person hopes for light, for divine guidance or relief. Tenebras and lux are balanced 
across both literal and figurative registers. Nashe’s alteration, on the other hand, 
is oddly askew. Post tenebras dies unsettles a too familiar phrase. “Day” is not the 
exact opposite of “darkness.” Days, after all, can themselves include darkness (e.g. 
shadows, stormy weather). Nashe, rather than merely citing a biblical verse, 
rearranges it and disturbs the relationship between the terms. Dies has none of the 
figurative heft of Lux. Tenebras seems all the more foreboding when shorn of its 
contrary term. This small, almost trivial, introduction to The Terrors of the Night 
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instills in us a certain hermeneutical or epistemological anxiety that is not alleviated 
even when the motto reappears in a fuller form within the pamphlet itself. Nashe 
says that he can think of “nothing more aptly” to compare the “working of our 
brains after we have unyoked and gone to bed than the glimmering and dazzling 
of man’s eyes when he comes newly out of the bright sun into the dark shadow.”70  
Dies and tenebras interact with each other to explain the brain’s night work, but this 
is not a hopeful sentiment. Nashe seems only to want to highlight the “glimmering 
and dazzling,” the evanescent and transitory experience of a sudden alteration in 
circumstance. The emphasis falls on the way in which we automatically respond 
to change and are momentarily bewildered by it. We see that some change has 
taken place, but can do little in response other than to wait to become accustomed. 
My eyes, however, still glimmer and dazzle at the changed vulgate verse. Nashe’s 
acts of defamiliarization bewilder, but trying to make them customary by calling 
them “acts of defamiliarization” and bringing them into line with known rhetorical 
maneuvers does little to assuage their work. The motto stays strange. Despite 
having read Post tenebras dies more times than I care to recall, I have not found a 
satisfactory way of reading it. It unsettles and I stay vulnerable, despite my best 
efforts, to its work. It exceeds my grasp just as The Terrors are something that Nashe 
says exceeded his.    
 In the dedication to Elizabeth Carey, Nashe is pulled away from the 
epistle’s ostensible purpose and explains how The Terrors came to be published in 
the first place.71 “A long time since hath it lain suppressed by me, until the urgent 
importunity of a kind friend of mine [...] wrested a copy from me,” Nashe 
remarks.72 The Terrors of the Night sees the light of day regardless of the author’s 
wishes. “That copy,” Nashe goes on to say, “progressed from one scrivener’s shop 
to another, and at length grew so common, that it was ready to be hung out for 
one of their signs, like a pair of indentures.”73 The circulation of Nashe’s text was, 
we are led to believe, so prolific that its ubiquity served as an advertisement for 
the act of writing itself. Those parts of the text that are properly Nashean, both 
his style and content, fall away in the scriveners’ scrivening. Nashe’s authorized 
copy enters the fray of unauthorized copies already in the marketplace. The only 
distinguishing feature between legitimate and illegitimate Terrors is superficial. 
While I have insisted on the particularity of Nashe’s tract, one of Nashe’s first acts 
in The Terrors is to undermine that particularity.  
Even attempting to reassert The Terrors as properly his own does not allow 
him full control over it. Near the end of the dedication, he remarks that “[n]ow” 
he “must tie [him]self to the printer’s paper limits, and knit up much thankfulness 
in few words.”74 The act of printing is initially conceived as profitable, but now it 
is figured as costly.75 It preserves and disseminates writing, but alters and disturbs 
that writing in the process. Nashe’s statement might be read as a generic 
supplicatory gesture, but by invoking the printer’s paper limit Nashe subsequently 
calls attention to the literal pages we hold in our hand. The final page of the epistle 
in the second edition of The Terrors, for example, is blank (save the printer’s 
insertion of an emblem). The material circumstances of the text speak against what 
the text says. Whatever the circumstances in which we find the dedicatory epistle 
will change how that statement reads. Our eyes confirm or deny the validity of 
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Nashe’s gesture. Whether it was a truly felt or merely feigned expression is 
immaterial. Whether it is merely formulaic and traditional or another mark of 
Nashe’s ingenuity and self-consciousness is unclear. N. Katherine Hayles notes 
that “the materiality [of the medium] should be understood as existing in a 
complex dynamic interplay with content, coming into focus and fading into the 
background, depending on what performance the work enacts.”76 The materiality 
of Nashe’s text and the immateriality of Nashe’s work go hand in hand. As Steve 
Mentz says, it is this tension between work and text, between print and writing, 
that describes Nashe’s “sense of authorship.”77 Sivefors argues that Nashe’s 
authorial position involves “embody[ing] equivocation,” that his “authorial self-
definition did not imply [...] a preference for the printed, published word at the cost 
of the handwritten.”78  Nashe invokes his pen and standish in print on the page.79  
“So effectively does Nashe’s writing convey a sense of the intractable materiality 
of words and the unpredictable nature of his own stylistic enterprise that we come 
to imagine him continually present,” Lorna Hutson says.80 The presence of the 
author is scripted into and stripped from the printed page. The ongoing and the 
complete, imperfect and perfect, are presented on the page at the same time and 
force the reader to respond to contrarieties. No strong categorical difference can 
be maintained between what the text says and how it appears. This pamphlet, or 
books more generally, do not allow readers to decide in advance what aspect is 
salient. The words themselves and the ink used to present them to our eye are of 
equal import. I cannot attend to both simultaneously, but nor can I focus on one 
aspect to the exclusion of the other.    
Print, as Mentz contends, “replaces and reforms the inherent disorder 
produced through writing,” but this is true only in a limited sense.81 Nashe never 
lets us forget about the disorder of writing. In particular, the moral disorder caused 
by books is a consistent concern. The night is “the devil’s Black Book” and when 
we are left alone in this book “the table of our heart is turned to an index of 
iniquities and all our thoughts are nothing but texts to condemn us.”82 This is a 
terror about terrors, but also a book about books. This “gallimaufrey” of reflexive 
gestures does not, to my eye, read as mere writerly ingenuity. There are ethical 
matters at stake. In A Sermon Preached at Paul’s Cross on Trinity Sunday, 1571, E. B. 
makes an impassioned plea for a particular act of reading. He wishes that men, 
women, and children would attend to The Book of Psalms and seek comfort in it 
because they are, as Augustine says, “a shield against the terrors of the night.”83  
The Terrors of the Night claims to perform a similar service for its readers, but when 
it tries to undo or debunk the doxa of night terrors things go awry. What books do 
or can do in Nashe’s book is not given any unambivalent ethical value. For 
example, Nashe promises that the devil “cannot but” have read Horace when 
Horace wrote “Noctem peccatis et fraudibus obiice nubem” [By night-time sin, and cloak 
thy fraud in clouds].84 The devil as keeper and reader of books leaves us uncertain 
what moral consequences follow from reading or writing. Does our esteem for 
Horace increase or decrease? Is our estimation of the devil altered by his readerly 
habits?  Nashe maintains an explicit interest in the role reading and writing play in 
shaping one’s behavior and understanding, but it is hard to read or recapitulate in 
writing what he is trying to express exactly. Even when the pamphlet conforms to 
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humanist norms through paired quotation and explanation, Nashe pushes against 
readerly comfort by metaphorizing and figuring wildly. This is on spectacular 
display in a labyrinthine and convoluted passage involving birds. 
Attempting to give an account of why it might be the case that the devil 
operates predominantly after dark, Nashe quotes Ovid. The devil seeks to conceal 
his “nets of temptation” and since, as Ovid says, “Quae nimis apparent retia vitat avis” 
[Too open nets even simple birds do shun], he is best served by working at night. 
A mess of figurative and literal associations follow. Only a page earlier, Nashe 
equates the night to Noah’s raven. Night, like the raven after the flood, is a 
harbinger only of ill tidings, bears only bad news. Thus, night is a bird, but night 
is also the time in which the devil can best catch birds. We and the night are both 
birds. The bird metaphor seems at the breaking point, but Nashe continues. 
“Those that catch birds,” Nashe says, “imitate their voices; so will [the devil] 
imitate the voices of God’s vengeance to bring us like birds into the net of eternal 
damnation.”85 God’s vengeance is like a bird’s song. Birds are the space, means, 
and objects of the devil’s work.86 The metaphor has become fully saturated. The 
tenor continually changes as the vehicle stays constant. Birds proliferate 
figuratively, referring to different things with each new iteration, and thus become 
hard to track. If metaphors are typically employed to ellucidate, then Nashe has 
other ends in mind. We do not come to understand ourselves, the devil, or night 
more clearly through these dense illustrations, but we do come to feel the infernal 
problem of night vividly. Metaphor becomes a conduit of confusion in The Terrors, 
but so too are Nashe’s acts of stripping language of all figurative sense.   
Explaining melancholy as the root cause of all unwelcome dreams, Nashe 
remarks that 
 
[E]ven as the slime and dirt in a standing puddle engender 
toads and frogs and many other unsightly creatures, so this 
slimy melancholy humor, still still thickening as it stands still, 
engendereth many misshapen objects in our imagination.87 
 
Just as the differential deployment of birds disturbs uptake by overdetermining 
the thing discussed, the repetition of “still” has the opposite effect. “Still” recurs 
to such a degree that it starts to move. This passage describes melancholy, but 
does not explain it. This description effectively engenders a “misshapen object” in 
our imagination as we read. Thickening humors like slimy puddles, frogs and bad 
ideas, immerse us in the muck and force us to recall Winters’ account of the 
imitative fallacy as an instance where form “succumbs” to “raw material.” This 
evocative passage does just this. The analogy infects the object analogized. 
Descriptions of what affects the imagination affect the imagination. This literally 
murky language captures and transmits the figuratively murky experience of 
melancholy. The parity between swamps and the humors we are beholden to are 
brought into even closer contact later. We are, as it happens, “but slime and mud” 
ourselves.88 The explanans is the explanandum. A tautology is created in 
retrospect. We are like slime and mud because we are slime and mud. 
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The substantial qualities of the dirty puddle stick to the terrors of the night 
even after they are said to be “nothing, but the echo of our conceits during the 
day.”89 The terrors that preoccupy us are simply “a bubbling scum or froth of 
fancy, which the day hath left undigested; or an after-feast made of the fragments 
of idle imagination.”90 The night is a space wherein the day’s activity reverberates. 
Our experience of it is just an excessive or residual product of the day’s labors. 
Nashe offers us an ontological difference between experiences of the day and 
night, between waking and dreaming life, but the fact that night terrors just are 
day terrors writ otherwise does not make them any less unwieldy. The clearest 
expression of how night terrors function, is more troubling still:  
 
In the day-time we torment our thoughts and imaginations 
with sundry cares and devices; all the night-time they quake 
and tremble after the terror of their late suffering, and still 
continue thinking of the perplexities they have endured.91 
 
In the transition from troubled days to troubling nights, “we” fall away. We are, it 
seems, solely the medium through which our thoughts and imaginations 
affectively express themselves. Thought thinks and feels in the night-time.92 
Holland’s assertion that Nashe’s Terrors has “none of the important consequences 
of Descartes’s dream experience” is unquestionably true in the grand scheme of 
things, but the above passage is far from inconsequential.93 For Nashe, under the 
cover of darkness there is cogitare without ego. Thoughts “quake and tremble” like 
bodies.94 The properties of body and mind commingle, but “we,” that thing that 
potentially unites the two into some individual subject, slip away at night. While 
Descartes asserts that thought “cannot be stripped” from the thinker, Nashe 
implies that the thinker can be and is stripped from thought.95 Where Descartes 
takes his ego as “certain and unshakeable” epistemic ground, Nashe takes any “I” 
as uncertain and shakeable at night.96 Nashe is not skeptical about whether any “I” 
exists, but rather suggests that this “I” is of little value in regards to the thinking 
of thoughts.   
Descartes’ “mind enjoys wandering off the track and will not yet allow 
itself to be confined within the boundaries of truth” so he aims to “slacken its 
reins as far as possible - then, before too long, a tug on them at the right moment 
will bring it more easily back to obedience.”97 Descartes’ mind has a will of its 
own, but that will can be disciplined and curbed to the desires of the thinker and 
writer. The relationship is unmistakably one of subservience. Nashe, on the other 
hand, finds himself having “rid a false gallop these three or four pages” because 
“the night mare rides us.”98 The individual at night does not think or does not play 
an active role in thinking, but that does not mean the individual is unaffected. 
Nashe’s brain is something that is “wheeling and rolling on” unceasingly and in 
the process it effectuates the “turmoiling, mixing, and changing course of our 
thoughts.”99 We are subject to the activity of the brain. Nashe gives us little time 
to digest these insights. They are not philosophically developed or labored over at 
length. The consequences that follow from Nashe’s insights are left for us to worry 
over. Despite the fact that thoughts are not within the thinker’s remit and thus the 
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terrors exceed our purview, Nashe’s final paragraph leaves us with something like 
an imperative: “[H]e who in the day doth not good works enough to answer the 
objections of the night, will hardly answer at the Day of Judgment.”100  
The priority between day and night is inverted again. The day’s good 
works follow from the night’s abuses. We must somehow “answer” for the night, 
for the thoughts that derive from our “cares and devices.” These terrors arise 
without “us.” They are not our fault though they speak of or to our faults. We are 
not responsible for them, but we are nonetheless tasked with responding to them. 
Nashe, throughout the tract, suggests that reading or understanding what night 
terrors mean is out of the question, thus how ought we respond to them? If they 
say only uncertain things, then how are we to know that our answers are apt? If 
they confound and confuse matters, how are we to derive “good works” from 
them in any clear way? Moreover, Protestant theology would tell us that “good 
works” are not within the scope of “our” will at all. Good works are what God 
does. Neither the terrors we suffer nor the good works we might perform in 
response are under our power to shape. The Terrors leaves us at once with a total 
evacuation of agency, but the provocative suggestion that this state of affairs 
cannot or does not stop us from trying to assert agency all the same.      
Above and beyond “the disordered skirmishing and conflicting of our 
sensitive faculties” at night, the more pressing problem, for Nashe, is that we 
subsequently feel compelled to “pursue and hunt after a further fear in the 
recordation and too busy examining our pains over-passed.”101 Our trouble is 
aggravated by trying to figure out our trouble. The night poses a question that 
cannot be understood clearly and that we ought not investigate too busily. Nashe 
calls on us to do good works that respond to something we do not understand, 
but these works never quite put the night’s objections to rest. There is no 
guarantee that these answers will stand up to the Day of Judgment. We must risk 
answering to thoughts beyond our ken and events beyond our lives, but without 
ground to know whether any answer will satisfy. No ethical advice is given. No 
salve for the terrors we have encountered is provided. Directly following this short 
final paragraph, we read “FINIS.”102 This formal commonplace takes on an 
untoward weight after the invocation of the apocalypse, but maybe that’s the joke? 
Maybe, on the other hand, Nashe had no say in the FINIS.   
Lichfield says that Nashe has “a terminus a quo [...] but no terminus ad 
quem.”103 The terrors of The Terrors are never done. In the end I am no closer to 
understanding or being able to account for the terrors than I was at the start. Since 
the terrors of the night are just the terrors of the day, I am, it seems, always in the 
midst of them. As night follows day or day follows night, Nashe’s Terrors leaves us 
questioning our capacity to respond in any sense. I am left wondering how to do 
good work, whether the work I do is good, and whether said work is mine at all. 
Maybe there are no final conclusions to be had other than that final conclusions 
are not ours to be had?         
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